An anti-nuclear response: How Europe can counter Putin's apocalyptic threats even if Donald Trump takes back the White House
A new round of nuclear blackmail
Vladimir Putin has embarked on a new round of nuclear blackmail, only this time the threatening statements are accompanied by actions focused squarely on Europe.
In late May 2024, while answering questions from journalists, Putin urged Europeans to remember that they live in “states with small territories and very dense populations” and that they ought to take “this factor” into account when considering allowing Ukraine to use Western long-range precision weapons against targets deep inside Russia's internationally recognized territory.
Then, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in early June, Putin started making more transparent threats. Firstly, he emphasized Europe's “defenselessness” against a possible strike because, unlike the United States and Russia, the continent is not protected by a well-developed anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) system. Secondly, the Russian leader explicitly stated the power of the tactical nuclear weapons at his disposal and spoke to Russia’s quantitative superiority in this category:
“Our tactical nuclear weapons are four times more powerful than the bombs used by the Americans against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Three or four times! We have many times more of them in terms of numbers — both on the European continent, and even if the Americans bring their own from the United States, we still have many times more.”
Thirdly, Putin touched on the very important and painful issue of the possibility of a nuclear war involving strategic warheads, expressing doubts that the Americans would intervene in the event that Europe came under a full-scale Russian nuclear attack:
“If those with whom we will exchange such strikes no longer exist, will the Americans get involved in this exchange of strikes at the level of strategic weapons or not? I doubt it very much, and the Europeans should think about this.”
In addition, Putin announced the willingness to implement changes to Russia’s Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons and nuclear testing if the need arose. All of the above could be attributed to the information warfare rhetoric that has already become traditional during the war in Ukraine, but this time the words have also been accompanied by actions — albeit largely symbolic ones.
On May 21, 2024, Russia commenced its first-ever exercises of non-strategic nuclear forces. In the initial stage, troops from the Southern Military District practiced receiving nuclear warheads for Iskander systems, transporting them to designated strike areas and equipping Kinzhal missiles with the warheads.
The second stage of the exercise, also conducted in Belarus, saw the involvement of naval forces and attack aviation alongside the Iskanders. Notably, during a parade in Minsk, Iskander missiles adorned with radiation hazard emblems were prominently displayed.