Asymmetric Counterooffensive: The Ukrainian Armed Forces are close to imposing a complete energy blockade on Crimea and have cut off the Azov transport route

Over the past two months, Ukraine's asymmetric aerial counteroffensive has evolved from a series of strikes against the land corridor to Crimea into a systematic campaign to isolate the peninsula and disrupt Russian logistics across southern Ukraine. Strikes on the Novorossiya highway had rendered it largely unsuitable for transporting supplies to Crimea by mid-June, while sustained attacks on bridges and crossings across the Perekop Isthmus have severed the occupied territories of southern Ukraine from the previously annexed Crimea.

The Ukrainian drone campaign in the Sea of Azov initially sought to disrupt maritime fuel deliveries to Crimea. It rapidly expanded, however, into a large-scale operation targeting Russia's feeder fleet, which sustains not only cargo deliveries to the peninsula but also the transport of grain and oil across the shallow waters of the Sea of Azov to deep-water Black Sea ports for onward export. As a result, an important segment of Russia's Black Sea export infrastructure has been effectively cut off.

Finally, strikes on the power bridge supplying electricity to Crimea have completed the perimeter of the peninsula's energy blockade, with conditions steadily moving towards a humanitarian crisis. Large parts of Crimea, particularly the north, have been without electricity for more than ten days, leading to the closure of shops and the disruption of water supplies and mobile communications.

Ukraine is systematically imposing a multi-pronged blockade of Crimea across land, sea, fuel and electricity, transforming the peninsula from a strategic stronghold into a vulnerable, trapped enclave. It intends to use this blockade as a tool of coercion, demonstrating that Moscow could lose control over the war's most important territorial gains and that the balance of power is determined not only by the current front line.

The Russian authorities continue to downplay the scale of the problem and offer Crimea's residents increasingly implausible assurances. In practice, however, they appear to be relying on a symmetrical response by intensifying strikes against the port infrastructure of Odesa in an effort to raise the costs of continuing the war for Ukraine and its allies.

The Siege of Crimea

From the outset of Ukraine's drone offensive against Russian infrastructure, the blockade of Crimea occupied a position of particular symbolic importance because it directly challenges what the Kremlin regards as Vladimir Putin's most important ‘gain’ in Ukraine (→ Re:Russia: Corridor of Opportunity). The first stage of this effort consisted of sustained drone strikes against the Novorossiya highway, linking Rostov-on-Don and Simferopol, during the second half of May. By the second half of June, these attacks had partially paralysed the route and effectively derailed Crimea's tourist season. This success encouraged the Ukrainian command to pursue a broader strategy aimed at imposing an energy blockade on the peninsula.

Historically, Crimea has depended on imported fuel. Before Russia's occupation in 2014, petroleum products were supplied primarily from Ukraine's Kremenchuk refinery and through imports arriving at Ukrainian ports. Crimea also possesses modest domestic oil and gas production, which some analysts consider to have long-term potential, although its contribution to the peninsula's energy supply remains limited. The only operating refinery in Crimea, Aktash, specialises in niche products such as marine fuel, fuel oil and components for Arctic diesel. Following the annexation, the main route for fuel imports became rail deliveries via the Kerch ferry crossing (connecting the ports of ‘Kavkaz’ and ‘Crimea’), which accounted for up to 75% of petroleum products, according to media reports. However, over the subsequent decade, to expand the peninsula’s supply capabilities and transport accessibility, Russia has invested at least 700–900 billion roubles in modernising Crimea’s logistics infrastructure, including the construction of the Crimean Bridge, the ‘Novorossiya’ motorway, a new railway line along the coast of the Sea of Azov, linking Rostov-on-Don with Crimea via Mariupol, Berdyansk and Melitopol, as well as the modernisation of the port of ‘Crimea’.

However, by June 2026, these routes had become largely inaccessible. The Crimean Bridge has been closed to rail fuel shipments since autumn 2022, while both the land corridor and the bridges and crossings across the Perekop Isthmus have come under sustained Ukrainian drone attacks (→ Re:Russia: Land–Air–Land). At the same time, strikes against maritime supply routes intensified from late April onwards. The major oil terminal at Feodosia, capable of handling up to 12 million tonnes of refined petroleum products annually, has been virtually destroyed. Ukrainian forces attacked the facility at least six times, including three confirmed strikes during April and May alone. As a result of these attacks, by 30 May no more than five of the port’s 33 storage tanks remained undamaged, according to the ‘Crimean Wind’ channel. At the same time, the Kerch ferry crossing also became inoperable, as of 1 June, after all three vessels that had been transporting fuel across the strait were put out of action. The ferry infrastructure has been attacked several more times since then, and on 21 June the Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters formally suspended ferry services until ‘a relevant decision is taken’.

Consequently, by July deliveries of petroleum products to Crimea had become possible almost exclusively through the TES Terminal-1 complex in Kerch. The terminal was originally designed to receive petroleum products delivered by rail ferry. Following the destruction of that logistics chain, however, fuel is now transported by tanker from ports in the Sea of Azov before being unloaded into the terminal's storage facilities and redistributed across Crimea by road. This has made deliveries considerably slower and more complex. Because the Kerch terminal can accommodate only small river-sea class tankers, a persistent unloading bottleneck has emerged.

The Azov Tsushima and its consequences

This bottleneck was the primary target of an operation by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) codenamed ‘MoLoChKa’ (which stands for ‘Moscow will fall via Crimea’). However, as this campaign unfolded, its objectives expanded considerably. In essence, it evolved into a systematic assault on Russia's so-called feeder fleet, comprising shallow-draught river-sea tankers and cargo vessels operating in the shallow waters of the Sea of Azov. These vessels supplied the Kerch terminal while also transferring grain, oil and other cargoes to larger ships waiting offshore in the Black Sea for onward export, explained SBS Commander Robert ‘Magyar’ Brovdi.

According to his statements, as of 17 July, the operation had damaged 117 vessels in the Sea of Azov, including 80 tankers. None of the vessels was sunk, but they were reportedly rendered inoperable. The campaign broadened because Ukrainian drones encountered virtually no resistance, according to the pro-war Telegram channel ‘Osvedomitel’: ‘A flotilla of defenceless ships was herded into one location, creating easy hunting grounds for enemy drone operators’. From 10 July, strikes were also carried out on the ports of Taganrog and Azov, where most of these vessels are loaded, as reported by the OSINT channel ‘KiberBoroshno’ (the remaining vessels primarily serve terminals connected to the Volga-Don Canal).

Dynamics of strikes against the feeder fleet in the Sea of Azov, 6–14 July 2026, number of tankers attacked

In the early days of the operation, Brovdi maintained a list of targets hit (which included 25 vessels), though this list contains a number of inconsistencies. Nevertheless, the campaign's overall effectiveness appears difficult to dispute. Satellite imagery indicates that the number of operational vessels in the Sea of Azov fell by 67%, from 132 to 43. As Important Stories has established, the eight Russian tankers damaged during the first two days of the operation alone were capable of carrying more than 18,000 tonnes of fuel oil, over 11,000 tonnes of gas condensate, 12,000 tonnes of marine fuel and 4,300 tonnes of petrol.

From 15 July, the campaign against tankers expanded to the Black Sea, where, over three days, according to Brovdi, a further 42 shallow-draught vessels had been damaged, including 23 oil tankers and 12 dry cargo ships transporting cargoes to deep-water export terminals. His daily reports also suggest an increasing focus on grain carriers. Between 6 and 17 July, 31 dry cargo vessels were reportedly damaged across the two seas. During the first week of the campaign, attacks averaged one or two ships per day, rising to five vessels on both 13 and 14 July, and nine on 17 July.

According to Reuters, the Russian authorities suspended navigation on the Volga-Don Shipping Canal, which links the Don River with the Sea of Azov, on 10 July and simultaneously stopped accepting applications for passage through the Kerch Strait. Global wheat futures responded by rising 3-5%. Within Russia's tightly controlled media environment, however, the effective loss of control over the Sea of Azov, long described by the Kremlin as Russia's ‘internal sea’, has received almost no public attention. When the Russian edition of Forbes requested clarification regarding restrictions on navigation, the Ministry of Transport reportedly responded only with vague statements.

In practical terms, the campaign has interrupted the shallow-water transport corridor on which Russia relied to supply Crimea and transfer oil and grain from the Sea of Azov to vessels serving the country's Black Sea export infrastructure. According to market analysts cited by Kommersant, ports in the Sea of Azov account for around 25% of Russia's grain and sunflower oil exports, although more conservative estimates place the figures at 15% and 20%, respectively. The same fleet uses this route to transport grain from terminals located on the Volga. Alternative routes to deep-water Black Sea ports do exist, but reorganising the logistics would significantly increase costs (farmers believe that state subsidies would be required for rail transport) and overload the transport infrastructure, raising demand for motor fuel. Analysts interviewed by Forbes argue that the disruption could become critical during August and the autumn export season, when wheat shipments normally peak. Unless navigation through the shallow-water corridor is restored before then, export losses appear unavoidable.

Thus, what began as an operation intended to complete Crimea's fuel blockade has therefore developed into a broader strike against Russia's transport and export infrastructure, casting doubt on Moscow's control over another of the territorial and strategic gains it has sought to consolidate during the war.

Blackout island

Crimea’s energy system is also deficient in terms of electricity supply. According to official data, peak electricity demand across the peninsula, including Sevastopol, reached 1,687 MW during the summer of last year, while the combined installed capacity of the Balaklava and Tavricheskaya thermal power plants is only 940 MW. To address this shortfall, Russia constructed an electricity interconnector from Krasnodar Krai in 2015-2016 with a transmission capacity of up to 800 MW. Its key components include the Kuban transition station near Taman, where the submarine cable comes ashore on the mainland, the PP-2 Crimea receiving station on the peninsula, and the 330 kV Simferopol substation, which serves as the central electricity distribution hub for Crimea.

The systematic campaign against Crimea's energy infrastructure, described by Brovdi as Operation ‘Crimean Switch Off’, also began in June. Between 12 June and 15 July, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck 63 energy-related targets. In June, attacks targeted the Simferopol thermal power plant, the Balaklava power station, the Glebovo underground gas storage facility and other energy assets. Following the strike on the Balaklava Thermal Power Station on 25 June, a ‘temporary power rationing regime’ was introduced in both Sevastopol and Crimea as a whole, as reported by the Russian-appointed governor Razvozzhayev on his Telegram channel. He also warned in this regard of possible disruptions to mobile communications and the water supply. The following day, the governors of Sevastopol and Crimea declared a ‘regional state of emergency’. On 29 June, Ukrainian forces carried out their first strike against the Kuban transition station. Pro-war Russian military bloggers described this event as an attempt to ‘disable elements of the energy bridge’, which in the long term threatens to result in a ‘full-scale energy blockade of the peninsula’. In July, the intensity of the attacks rose sharply (52 of the 63 strikes documented by the Security Service of Ukraine took place in the first two weeks of the month). Among the repeated targets was the PP-2 Crimea conversion facility, the Crimean anchor point of the electricity interconnector, which was reportedly struck twice.

Strikes on Crimea’s energy infrastructure, 1 June–15 July 2026

Main targets of Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes on energy facilities in Crimea, 1 June–15 July 2026

The July strikes repeatedly caused power cuts across the entire peninsula. A massive blackout occurred on 6 July, leaving Sevastopol, among other places, without power. Following the attack on 8 July, Kerch, Dzhankoi, Krasnoperekopsk, Armiansk and surrounding areas were left without power. As a result of the strike on the night of 14 July against the Balaklava Thermal Power Station in Sevastopol, a rolling blackout schedule of ‘two hours with power, six hours without’ was introduced. According to information as of 15 July, the north-west and east of Crimea remain ‘partially without power’. By mid-July, conditions on the peninsula had begun to take on the characteristics of a humanitarian crisis. In northern Crimea, grocery shops have reportedly been closing because they are unable either to receive deliveries or to store perishable goods. Since 8 July, regular disruptions to water supplies have been reported in Simferopol, Kerch, Yevpatoria, Feodosia, Dzhankoi, Alushta, Bakhchisarai, Saky, Krasnoperekopsk, Armyansk and Sudak, as noted by The Agency. From 15 July, mobile communications in Dzhankoi were restricted to two four-hour windows each day, from 08:00 to 12:00 and from 14:00 to 18:00. On 13 July, the head of occupied Crimea Aksyonov stated that a schedule had been prepared for the distribution of electricity generators to towns and districts across the peninsula. Priority, he said, would be given to localities that had been without electricity for more than 12 days. He also promised to distribute free supplies of bottled liquefied petroleum gas to areas without power, although he did not specify when or where these deliveries would begin. Meanwhile, volunteers have begun providing humanitarian assistance. On the Russian social media platform VKontakte, emergency fundraising campaigns have been launched to collect drinking water and other essential supplies for residents of northern Crimea.

Rules of engagement

The Russian authorities continue to downplay the scale of the crisis and, accordingly, offer responses and promises that appear either inadequate or unrealistic. In the official narrative, the strikes are presented as isolated disruptions to logistics rather than as elements of a systematic blockade. Following a meeting with Aksyonov and Razvozzhayev on 8 July, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev stated that ‘key decisions’ had been reached to stabilise the fuel and energy sector, whilst on 13 July Putin himself stated that ‘work is already beginning on creating a supply system that will be very difficult for the enemy to reach’. However, even experts remain in the dark as to what these ‘key solutions’ and this protected ‘supply system’ actually entail. At present, the Russian authorities appear unable to counter Ukrainian drones, which, having identified critical vulnerabilities, have rapidly expanded the scale of their operations, as demonstrated by the ‘Azov Tsushima’ campaign over the previous two weeks.

Ukrainian commentators frequently argue that the blockade has transformed Crimea from a staging area for Russian military operations into a logistical trap for Russian forces and equipment, while also increasing pressure on the Putin regime. From Kyiv's perspective, a blockade that Moscow proves unable to break could serve both as a tool of coercion and as a source of leverage in future negotiations. More broadly, it demonstrates that in a drone-dominated war the balance of power cannot be measured solely by the location of the front line.

However, for the time being, the Kremlin appears to be focusing not on attempts to restore supply routes to Crimea or on the negotiation process, but on creating a symmetrical threat. Since 11 July, Russian troops have been launching large-scale strikes on port infrastructure in the Odesa region. According to military analyst Oleksander Kovalenko, Odesa experienced its most intensive missile and drone attacks since 2023 during the first two days of the campaign, with Russia reportedly firing 26 Kh-59/69 ballistic missiles and six Kh-31P missiles. Moscow had not employed such numbers of these systems since the opening days of its full-scale invasion in 2022. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the strikes targeted port facilities used by the Ukrainian armed forces. In reality, hits on civilian infrastructure were recorded. According to Ukraine’s Minister for Community and Territorial Development, Oleksii Kuleba, as a result of the strike on 13 July in Odesa, a civilian merchant vessel was hit while unloading mineral fertilisers, as well as a road transport company. However, Ukrainian officials are also likely to be understating the overall impact of the attacks, much as the Russian authorities have tended to minimise the effects of Ukrainian strikes.

From Russia’s perspective, such strikes are intended to increase the costs for the Ukrainian economy, on the one hand, and for Ukraine’s European allies, on the other. In this sense, they serve as a means of coercion to force negotiations, but on Russia’s terms.